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Assemblage Theory
and Schizoanalysis
Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, assemblage theory, as it has come to be
known in recent years (largely due to the efforts of Actor Network Theory rather
than Deleuzians, I might add), is steadily gathering a significant following in
the social sciences. There can be no question that it has generated interesting
and important new ways of thinking about the complex nature of social reality (again, largely due to the efforts of Actor Network Theory). But it has also
drifted a long way from its origins and in doing so a number of both small and
large misprisions of Deleuze and Guattari’s work have slipped under the radar
and embedded themselves as ‘truths’. This is particularly true of the DeLandaled version of assemblage theory, but he is far from being the only ‘guilty’ party
in this regard. I have never been one to think that there is no such thing as
a ‘right’ or a ‘wrong’ reading, so I’m going to simply go ahead and say assemblage
theory makes two kinds of error in their appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari:
(1) it focuses on the complex and undecidable (Actor Network Theory); and/or
(2) it focuses on the problem of emergence (DeLanda). It may be that these are
providential errors because they give rise to new and interesting ways of thinking
in their own right, though I have my doubts on that front, but they nevertheless
cloud our understanding of our Deleuze and Guattari and in that regard call for
our critical attention.
Assemblage is now so widely used as a term it is generally forgotten that in
spite of its Francophone appearance, it is actually an English word. Assemblage
is Brian Massumi’s translation of agencement which, as John Law has noted,
encompasses a range of meanings that include “to arrange, to dispose, to fit up,
to combine, to order”.1 It could therefore just as appropriately be translated as
arrangement, in the sense of a ‘working arrangement’, provided it was kept clear
that it described an ongoing process rather than a static situation. It could also
be thought in terms of a ‘musical arrangement’, which is a way of adapting an abstract plan of music to a particular performer and performance. Arrangement is
in many ways my preferred translation for these reasons. This is not to say I dis1

J. Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research, London 2004, s. 41.
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agree with Massumi’s choice, which like all translations has its problems but is
very far from being wrong or inappropriate. It is considerably better than several
other choices that have also been tried. For example, Gary Genosko translates
agencement as ‘layout’, which is too static in my view. It implies something much
flatter and more fixed than an arrangement, which can at least imply a temporal
as well as spatial aspect. Similarly, the use of the word ‘ensemble’ is also problematic because it lacks the contingency of arrangement, which can always fail.
Assemblage is problematic for these reasons too, though less so, which is why
I ultimately favour arrangement.
It is worth adding that agencement is Deleuze and Guattari’s own translation,
or perhaps re-arrangement would be a better word, of the German word Komplex
(as in the ‘Oedipal complex’ or the ‘castration complex’). Despite the fact it is
Guattari himself who defines the assemblage this way in the various glossaries
he has provided, the connection between Freud’s complex and the concept of the
assemblage has been almost completely ignored. This may go some way toward
explaining the origin of the two kinds of errors I will discuss in what follows – it
appears to me that the term assemblage has been taken at face value, as though
the concept was somehow self-explanatory. It would be interesting to know why
Massumi chose that particular word. My guess – and I emphasise that it is purely
a guess – is that he was thinking of the famous MOMA exhibition curated by
William C. Seitz, the Art of the Assemblage (1961), which featured several artists
central to Deleuze and Guattari’s work.2 If so, it was an inspired choice, but one
that still needs to be triangulated, if you will, by factoring in Guattari’s strange
comments on this type of assemblage art in his essay Balancing-Sheet Program
for Desiring Machines which was appended to the second edition of Anti-Oedipus
so as not to succumb to the objective fallacy (as Deleuze calls it) of treating assemblage as already understood.
Referring to Man Ray’s collage ‘dancer/danger’, Guattari observes that what
is crucial about this piece of sculpture is the fact that it doesn’t work. He means
this quite literally: its working parts, its cogs and wheels and so on, do not turn or
intermesh with one another in a mechanical fashion. It is precisely for that reason,
he argues, that it works as a piece of art.3 It works by creating an association (i.e.,
refrain) between the human dancer and the inhuman machine and thereby brings
them into a new kind of relation which Deleuze and Guattari would later call the
assemblage, but in their first works they called the desiring-machine. Desiringmachines are the working parts of the machinic unconscious; it is their operation
that the pragmatics of schizoanalysis is tasked to understand. The only time they
make a direct comparison between the unconscious and actual machines is when
they compare it to the absurd machines of the Dadaists, surrealists, as well as the
2
3

See: W. Seitz, The Art of the Assemblage, New York MOMA 1961.
F. Guattari, Balancing-Sheet Program for Desiring Machines, [w] idem, Chaosophy, trans. R. Hurley,
New York 1995, s. 120.
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infernal machines imagined by Buster Keaton and Rube Goldberg.4 And again,
what is crucial is that these machines don’t work. In other words, the obvious
mechanical explanation of various machines is precisely not what Deleuze and
Guattari had in mind when they conceived of the concept of the assemblage and
its forerunner the desiring-machine.
Yet this is precisely how assemblage tends to be treated. For that reason, let
me quickly return to Freud to try to re-orient thinking about the assemblage.
According to Laplanche and Pontalis there are three senses of the word complex
in Freud’s writing: (1) “a relatively stable arrangement of chains of association”;
(2) “a collection of personal characteristics – including the best integrated ones
– which is organised to a greater or lesser degree, the emphasis here being on
emotional reactions”; (3) “a basic structure of interpersonal relationships and the
way in which the individual finds and appropriates his place”. Laplanche and
Pontalis also note that there is an underlying tendency toward ‘psychologism’ inherent in the term. Not only does it imply that all individual behaviour is shaped
by a latent, unchanging structure, it also allows that there is a complex for every
conceivable psychological type.5 The key point I want to make here is that none
of these ways of thinking about the complex actually requires that we give any
consideration to a material object. This isn’t to say material objects cannot form
part of an assemblage because clearly they can, and Deleuze and Guattari give
several examples of this, but it is to say the assemblage is not defined by such
objects and as Bettelheim’s case history of ‘little Joey’ demonstrates can function
perfectly well without them.6
One of the great insights of that it shows that material objects can and frequently do have agential power. This idea is far from being incompatible with
Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking, but one should be wary of making it the central
point of analysis as ANT does. This isn’t to say that the search for non-human
actors isn’t an important project, but it is to say that it misses what is central to
assemblage: it should be seen as a solution rather than a cause. One might say
this is the nub of what ANT gets wrong with respect to the assemblage, but the
problems run deeper than that because ANT use the assemblage to name a complex form of causality which it might be useful to think of as distributed or distributive because of the way it rejects both direct and indirect causality in favour
of a third option which attributes causality to the whole network of interacting
elements. To take an illustrative case in point, John Law uses assemblage to deal
with complex social and cultural situations or problematics which can neither
be reduced to a single instance, object or truth nor allowed to remain indefinite,
4

5

6

Ibidem, s. 135. This essay originally appeared as the appendix to the second edition of Anti-Oedipus.
In the text Guattari actually refers to Julius Goldberg, but from the discussion that follows it is clear
he meant Rube Goldberg.
J. Laplanche, J-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith,
London 1973, s. 72-74.
See my discussion: I. Buchanan, Little Hans Assemblage, “Visual Arts Research” 39 (1), s. 9-17.
As Bettelheim notes, little Joey’s machines function regardless of whether or not he had props.
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undecidable or purely perspectival as though to say (pace Derrida) that there is
no discernible object, instance or truth.
Law’s ‘gold standard’ test case, if you will, is the Ladbroke Grove train crash
in 1999, which killed 23 people and injured 414 others.7 As he notes, a single
or definitive explanation of the cause of the accident is impossible, not only because both the drivers involved died in the crash. There were simply too many
factors that could have been the cause for any single factor to blame, ranging
from driver error to machine or system failure. Yet given the need to learn from
it and thereby prevent a recurrence of this type of tragedy forensic analysis needed to produce something more solid than an open-ended ‘anything is possible’
finding. As Law explains, there are in effect two kinds of problem here – the
first can be solved rather easily, instead of a single answer, we can offer multiple
answers, or rather multiple explanations, and this is precisely what the inquest
did. But this raises a second and much trickier problem because multiple explanations tend to give rise to the perception of indefiniteness, thus making the
findings seem more not less credible for being multiple, even though in point
of fact the explanation is more likely to be multiple than single. Deleuze and
Guattari’s solution, which Law partially adopts, is to ‘trouble’ the distinction
between single and multiple.
[T]he absence of singularity does not imply that we live in a world
composed of an indefinite number of disconnected bodies […] It does not
imply that reality is fragmented. It instead implies something much more
complex. It implies that different realities overlap and interfere with one
another. Their relations, partially coordinated, are complex and messy.8

Deleuze and Guattari’s solution is in fact more radical than Law’s – where
he is only prepared to trouble the distinction single and multiple, they reject it
altogether. By postulating multiple, overlapping realities, Law cannot escape the
charges of pluralism, perspectivalism, and relativism that he hopes to escape by
exactly this means. The train drivers didn’t have a separate reality from each
other, nor did they have a separate reality from the signal switch that may or
may not have failed, and so on. Similarly Deleuze and Guattari insist that there
is no such thing as ‘psychic’ reality, which would somehow be different from
other kinds of reality.9 There is only one reality, but that reality is multiple in
and of itself and we need conceptual tools like Deleuze and Guattari’s concept
of the assemblage to disentangle it and render visible its constitutive threads. If
we stay with Law’s train crash example, we can say that the drivers perhaps saw
things differently from each other – they were travelling in different directions
with different destinations – but that very difference in perception is constitutive
7
8
9

J. Law, op. cit., s. 93.
Ibidem, s. 61.
Schizophrenics may apprehend the world differently from other people, but that does not mean that
their interaction with the world isn’t real or that their grasp of the world lacks reality (a standard definition of psychosis is that it constitutes a loss of reality). We do not slip from one reality to another.
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of the reality they shared. The signal system was part of that reality, as was the
whole rail network, and behind that the whole hinterland (as Law usefully calls
it) of the drivers’ training, the design and manufacture of the trains, and so on.
To describe the crash fully, then, one has to follow the multi-various lines
that twist and turn and finally intersect to produce the event we know as the
Ladbroke Grove train disaster. To give this a more human scale, one might think
of the countless mini-decisions, chances and coincidences that led to those 23
people being on those trains at that particular time. Had any one of them missed
their train that day they might have cursed their luck, until they discovered that
chance had saved their life. But these decisions are essentially random – they are
only held together by the event itself. Had the trains not collided, these people
would not have died in this way, and their lives would not have intersected in
this way either. My point is that while it is an undoubtedly complex event, with
a great many elements, there is no particular analytic advantage in describing it
as an assemblage. It lacks the necessity of the ‘true’ assemblage – it is an accident, not an arrangement. There is nothing deliberate about it, therefore, strictly
speaking, it isn’t an assemblage.
As Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of ‘little Hans’ makes clear, the assemblage is a ‘living’ arrangement. Hans’ agoraphobia is an arrangement he has
with his anxieties, his neuroses, it is as much an attempt at self-cure (as Freud
might put it) as it is a symptom. Whatever it is that underpins his anxiety,
whether it is oedipally motivated or not, it is nonetheless assuaged by putting in
place an arrangement that inhibits the degree to which he has to confront that
anxiety. By limiting his encounter with ‘the street’ he limits his anxiety. This is
how the assemblage works. It always benefits someone or something outside of
the assemblage itself (the body without organs); along the same lines, the assemblage is purposeful, it is not simply a happenstance collocation of people, materials and actions, but the deliberate realisation of a distinctive plan (abstract
machine); lastly, the assemblage is a multiplicity, which means its components
are both known and integral to its existence, not unknown and undecided.
Law’s version of the assemblage is not the same as Deleuze and Guattari’s – this
doesn’t mean that the way he uses it is problematic in and of itself. As can be
seen in the example given above, it is used to map out a very particular type of
problem in the social sciences, one that is encountered in a great many situations, as is evident from the vast and rapidly growing body of work generated
by ANT theorists.
The same cannot be said for the second error – it reduces assemblage to the
status of adjective. The central exhibit here is Manuel DeLanda’s A New Philosophy of Society. As I will briefly explain, it typifies a general problem in the
reception of the concept of the assemblage. Aligned with Deleuze (and quite
pointedly not Guattari), it tactfully or perhaps tactically positions itself as ‘Deleuze 2.0’, and instructs us to feel free to ignore its connection to Deleuze altogether. Doubtless this is because conceptually it owes very little to Deleuze. As
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even a casual inspection can confirm Braudel, Goffman, and Weber, among
others, are much more central to DeLanda’s formulation of the assemblage than
Deleuze. The problem here isn’t simply that something that isn’t Deleuzian is
presented as Deleuzian, it runs much deeper than that. The real problem is that
‘Deleuze 2.0’ is conceptually stunted in comparison with the ‘original’. DeLanda
‘improves’ on Deleuze and Guattari by reformulating their concept in such a way
that it lacks all analytic power.
DeLanda treats the assemblage as an aggregate, albeit a complex aggregate of
the variety of an ecosystem. Nonetheless, for DeLanda the assemblage is an entity that grows in both scale and complexity as components are added. In his view,
assemblages are “wholes whose properties emerge from the interactions between
parts”. He suggests they can be used to “model” “entities” such “interpersonal
networks”, “social justice movements”, “cities”, and “nation-states”.10 Central to
DeLanda’s thinking about assemblages is Deleuze’s idea (drawn from Hume)
that relations are exterior to their terms. This enables DeLanda to offer an account of assemblages as ontologically “unique, singular, historically contingent,
[and] individual.”11 More particularly, though, DeLanda frames the assemblage
as a new way of thinking about part-whole relations, essentially pitching it as
a new kind of causality, one that acts without conscious intention or purpose.
For example, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe the authority structure of many organisations changed from a form
based on traditional legitimacy to one based on rational-legal bureaucratic
procedures. The change affected not only government bureaucracies, but
also hospitals, school and prisons. When studied in detail, however, no
deliberate plan can be discerned, the change occurring through the slow
replacement over two centuries of one set of daily routines by another.
Although this replacement did involve decisions by individual persons
[…] the details of these decisions are in most cases causally redundant to
explain the outcome […].12

There are a number of problems here, but I will focus on just three ‘fatal
flaws’ in DeLanda’s account: first, the assemblage does not constitute a partwhole relation; second, the assemblage is not the product of an accumulation
of individual acts; and third, the assemblage does not change incrementally. To
say that a bureaucratic structure of authority was constituted by and ultimately
transformed by myriad individual acts says nothing but the obvious. One does
not even need a concept to make this claim. This is history in the mode of one
damn thing after another (as Arnold Toynbee famously put it). Focusing on the
‘how’ question as insistently as he does obscures the deeper and more interesting
‘what’ question. Worrying about how a particular authority structure actually
10

11
12

M. DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, London 2006,
s. 5-6.
Ibidem, s. 40.
Ibidem, s. 41.
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changes forgets that the real question here, at least insofar as assemblage theory
is concerned, is what is that structure of authority? How is it constituted?
Let me turn briefly to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the formation of the
state in Anti-Oedipus. As will be immediately obvious, it follows a path that is
diametrically opposite to the one mapped out by DeLanda. “The State was not
formed in progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke executed all
at once; the primordial Urstaat, the eternal model of everything the State wants
to be and desires.”13 History is in the Urstaat, in its head, not the other way
round: primitive society knew about the terrors of the state, Deleuze and Guattari argue (following Pierre Clastres), long before any actual states existed. Their
rituals and customs, centred on the destruction of accumulated ‘wealth’ (i.e.,
seeds, weapons, furs and so on) so as to institute a socially binding debt-relation
within the ‘tribe’ and between ‘tribes’, can be seen as staving off the formation
of an actual state, which requires wealth to come into being. It is the idea of the
state that concerns Deleuze and Guattari, not the practical matter of its coming
into being.14
DeLanda thus departs from Deleuze and Guattari in three crucial ways:
first, he always proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, whereas Deleuze and
Guattari (following Marx’s famous reversal of Hegel) tend to proceed from the
abstract to the concrete – the state is first of all an idea, it only subsequently
functions as a structure of authority; second it seems he cannot countenance
a purely immanent form of organisation that isn’t somehow undergirded by the
transcendent ‘real’, whereas Deleuze and Guattari say the exact opposite – the
state can only function as it does to the extent that it can become immanent;
and, third, he reverses the actual-virtual relation – he assumes that the concrete
‘bits and pieces’ are the actual, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari it is the structure of authority that is actual and the ‘bits and pieces’ that are virtual.15 This last
point will no doubt seem counter-intuitive, to put it mildly, but it is very clear
in Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the ‘actual factor’ in desiring-production
that the actual is what is self-generated and therefore active in the unconscious,
while the virtual is the imported and therefore inert or ‘dead’ element in the unconscious (for example, they describe the Oedipal complex as virtual).16
What then does Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage consist of? In brief, it is
derived from a combination of Stoic language philosophy, Speech-Act theory
and Hjelmslev’s so-called Glossematics. In practice, the assemblage is the productive intersection of a form of content (actions, bodies, things) and a form of
13

14

15

16

G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem
and H. R. Lane, London 1983, s. 217.
For a more detailed account of this process see I. Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus,
London 2008, s. 88-116.
For a more detailed account of this argument see I. Buchanan, Deleuze and Ethics, „Deleuze Studies”, vol. 5 2004, s. 17-18.
G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, op. cit., s. 129.
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expression (affects, words, ideas). The form of content and the form of expression
are independent of each other – their relationship is one of reciprocal presupposition (one implies and demands the other but does not cause or refer to it, e.g.
a sunset is an array of colours produced by the diffraction of light, but this does
not cause us to see it as beautiful or melancholic; by the same token, our concepts
of beauty and melancholy do not compel us to apprehend sunsets in this way).
Let me illustrate this with a very brief example.
In 1923, George Mallory made headlines around the world when in response
to the question ‘Why do you want to climb Mount Everest?’ he said ‘because it’s
there’. People at the time, and still, were both dumbfounded and immediately
comprehending of his seemingly blank statement, which appears to be uninterested in and not a little contemptuous of the actual physical features of the
mountain, beyond its imperious height. They were dumbfounded because they
expected him to say that it was the ultimate challenge or something that directly acknowledged the scale of the accomplishment were he to be able to pull
it off; but they also immediately comprehended the fact that he didn’t have to
say anything like that because everyone already knew that it was a monumental
challenge. One senses too that Mallory’s insouciance is gesturing to something
beyond the actual physical challenge of climbing Mount Everest to what we
might call its virtual or symbolic dimension. By virtue of its size, Mount Everest’s
‘there-ness’ in Mallory’s sense consists in its capacity to confer upon anyone who
scales it the attribute of having climbed the world’s highest peak. Mallory knew
that everyone knew that by being the first to scale the world’s highest peak his
body would acquire a new attribute – he would instantly become the first man
to have climbed Mount Everest. That incorporeal transformation, as Deleuze
and Guattari usefully call it, would stay with him for eternity. It is that aspect of
its ‘there-ness’ that everyone instantly grasps. This is the form of the expression.
The physical effort required to climb Mount Everest is the price of admission
to the symbolic realm of the select group of people who have conquered that
peak. This amounts to saying actual effort is required to enter the virtual realm,
which is also to say that events always occur on two planes at once –the empirical
plane of consistency (the physical effort of climbing the actual mountain) and
the abstract plane of immanence (the symbolic achievement of having climbed
a symbolically significant mountain). Effort is the form of content. There is
a feedback loop between these two forms. If the symbolic accolade (form of expression) is not great enough, then the effort (form of content) will seem out of
proportion; by the same token, if the effort (form of content) required is not great
enough, then the symbolic accolade (form of expression) will seem undeserved.
This can manifest itself in interesting ways. For example, apart from its
height, Mount Everest is not regarded as the most difficult of the 14 above
8000m climbs – that honour usually goes to K2, which has a 1 in 4 fatality
rate. If actual physical effort was the foundation of symbolic attainment, then
K2 should rank above Mount Everest, but it doesn’t except perhaps in the very
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small community of 8000-ers. The prestige of climbing the world’s highest peak
remains so great that overcrowding on the climb is now more imperilling than
the physical hazards of ice and rock. That prestige would evaporate, though, if
one could simply take a helicopter to the peak, or ride some kind of funicular car
to the top, making the journey as simple as getting to the airport or train station
on time. So the effort required to get to the top isn’t unimportant, by any means,
but it always sits in a dialectical relationship with the symbolic dimension. The
two planes must be adequate to each other. Anything that interrupts or interferes
with this dialectical relationship between the forms (expression and content) is
known as an assemblage converter.
In conclusion, then, however useful and analytically revealing assemblage
theory can be, in practice its use of the concept of the assemblage is often indistinguishable from that of an adjective, serving more to name than frame a problem. Therefore, rather than opening a problem up it tends to close it down.
Instead of a new understanding of the problem, it simply gives us a currently
fashionable way of speaking about it. This issue becomes more urgent the widely
assemblage theory is embraced. If everything is or must be an assemblage then
the term loses precision, indeed it loses its analytic power altogether.

Assemblage Theory and Schizoanalysis
This article suggests considering Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage apart from its various appropriations by what has emerged as ‘assemblage
theory’ that has, according to the author, generated its interesting but somehow diminished or reductive use. Looking at what might be perceived as errors in assemblage theory’s understandings (in Actor Network Theory and Manuel DeLanda’s
appropriations in particular) it proposes a new set of rules for use of the concept
that is more analytical and critically closer to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought.

Teoria asamblażu a schizoanaliza
Autor artykułu proponuje rozważenie koncepcji asamblażu autorstwa Deleuze’a i Guattariego w izolacji od licznych wcześniejszych przykładów przywłaszczenia, które zdaniem autora jedynie podszywały się pod nią, w zamian skutkując
interesującym, ale w jakimś przynajmniej stopniu umniejszającym czy też redukcyjnym użyciem. Spoglądając na to, co może zostać uznane za błędne w rozumieniu teorii asamblażu (w szczególności w teorii aktora-sieci czy w ujęciu Manuela
DeLandy), autor proponuje powrót do oryginalnej myśli Deleuze’a i Guattariego,
a w konsekwencji wysuwa propozycję nowego, bardziej analitycznego i krytycznego zestawu zasad omawianego pojęcia asamblażu.
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